In 'Relative Priority', I argue for a natural view in distributive ethics: that the good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the relatively better-off does, in virtue of the fact that they are relatively worse off. I refer to this position as relative prioritarianism. It contrasts with three popular positions in distributive ethics: utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and standard (absolute) prioritarianism.

In 'Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance', I provide a new argument for relative prioritarianism, which uses the 'veil of ignorance' method developed by Harsanyi and Rawls, along with my work on risk in decision theory.

In slogan form, relative prioritarianism says: everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. 

Work in progress provides formal support for relative prioritarianism; and extends relative prioritarianism to a view of uncertain social distributions.